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Abstract
This paper studies the optimal organizational form and the optimal type of manager by con-
sidering the nonmaterial (psychological) payoﬀ as well as the standard material payoﬀ for agents.
I compare two organizational forms: T-form, where all agents have the same job title so that
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and the others are subordinates who form a reference group. I show that the principal should
appoint a more (less) able agent to be the manager when the eﬀects of peer pressure are more
(less) critical. In addition, I ﬁnd the conditions under which H-form is more likely to be preferred
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1 Introduction
People often compare their actions with those of others in order to conﬁrm that their own actions
are proper from a social viewpoint. This behavior, generally referred to as social comparison, is one
of the most interesting issues in social psychology, human resource management, and other ﬁelds of
social science. Social comparison theory often asserts that social comparison is apt to occur in a
reference group. Here, a reference group can be deﬁned as a group that people see as a main source
for their own social identity. This means that people in a reference group are inclined to compare their
behavior with others in their own reference group. As mentioned by Baron and Kreps (1999), social
comparison theory also maintains that people think about themselves in comparison with others who
are similar;1
“¢ ¢ ¢ individuals exhibit a strong tendency to make social comparisons vis-a`-vis individuals
who are similar to themselves. Similarity here is a function of both personal characteristics
- such as age, gender, education - and being in a similar situation (for instance, within
a work organization, in the same occupation, job title, department, or entry cohort).”
(Baron and Kreps (1999), p.103)
As pointed out in the above quotation, one of the most important sources of social identity in a
reference group is a job title in a work organization such as a ﬁrm. Of course, the allocation of job
titles in a ﬁrm is also one of the most crucial problems when the top manager or owner of a ﬁrm
tries to ﬁnd the optimal organizational form. Thus, I note that the allocation of job titles leads to
an organizational form in that each job title deﬁnes social identity and forms a reference group, and
consequently that such reference group formations deﬁne an organizational form.2
This paper tries to build a formal economic model into which I incorporate the above insights
from sociological and psychological ﬁndings and study the optimal organizational form. In particular,
I focus on the eﬀects on incentives of identity as inﬂuenced by job title and peer pressure resulting from
social comparisons within a reference group. In particular, I focus on the eﬀects of identity inﬂuenced
by job titles and peer pressure through social comparisons in a reference group on incentives. In
this model, an agent’s sociological and psychological payoﬀ according to social identity has a crucial
role. For the sake of this purpose, I consider a principal-multiagent model where agents with limited
1This property of social comparison is mentioned in Festinger (1954). In addition, Merton (1957) broadly investigates
social comparison in a reference group in terms of relative deprivations.
2Baron and Kreps (1999) also have a similar concept of the formation of organizational forms; “Within organiza-
tions, ‘similarly situated’ often equates with rank and job title. To reduce invidious social comparisons, organizations
sometimes ﬁnd it useful to create bureaucratic distinctions between groups whom they wish to diﬀerentiate.” (Baron
and Kreps (1999), p.329.)
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liability are engaged in a project. The principal allocates a job title to each agent. I suppose, here,
that the job titles draw the boundaries of reference groups. That is, the agents with the same job title
are in the same reference group and they compare their actions with those of their colleagues in that
group. In this situation, I have to examine the issue of whether the principal allocates the same job
title to all of the agents. To investigate this, I consider two typical organizational forms. In one form,
the principal gives a unique job title to all of the agents. I call this organizational form “T-form,” as I
can interpret the agents as working together in a single “team.” In the other form of organization, the
principal allocates a particular (superior) job title (such as the “manager”) to one agent and another
(inferior) job title (such as the “subordinate”) to the other agents. Then, the manager is no longer
included in the reference group, which is composed of the other agents who are designated as the
subordinate. I call this organizational form “H-form,” as this form can be viewed as a “hierarchy.”3
Thus, one of the main purposes of this paper is to examine whether T-form or H-form is the optimal
organizational form.
A key component of this paper is the idea that the psychological payoﬀ for an agent is contingent
upon his identity, as deﬁned by his job title.4 On the one hand, such payoﬀs for the subordinate in
H-form and the member in T-form are attributed to the comparisons of the agents’ eﬀort levels in
the reference group to which they belong. This kind of payoﬀ is demonstrated in general research on
peer pressure. Here, peer pressure can be referred to as a pressure experienced by an agent when he
compares his action with the actions taken by his colleagues.5 On the other hand, the manager in
H-form is free from the peer pressure generated through comparisons of actions in the reference group.
This is because he is no longer in that group and does not share a social identity with the members of
the group. However, he establishes a new identity by being appointed to the superior job title. Thus,
I will be able to consider that this agent’s utility also depends on other additional payoﬀs related to
his new identity once he is appointed to be the manager.6 In general, people in the higher hierarchy
of a ﬁrm tend to have similar preferences to the ﬁrm. As a result, their utilities are more likely to
3The production technology in H-form is the same as that in T-form. Thus, the task of each agent does not change
contingent on his assigned job title. I will also explain this point in footnote 11.
4Of course, this kind of nonmaterial payoﬀ is not only psychological but also sociological. However, just for descriptive
simplicity, I call it the “psychological” payoﬀ in this paper. I again refer to this usage of psychological payoﬀ in footnote
8.
5See, for example, Kandel and Lazear (1992), Baron and Gjerde (1997), Huck et al. (2003), or Daido (2004, 2006). In
addition to research on peer pressure, some models with other-regarding preferences, such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
or Itoh (2004), have similar features in terms of social comparison. However, each agent compares his welfare, instead
of an action, with his colleagues in the models with other-regarding preferences.
6This view that the principal has an ability to change the agent’s identity is similar to that of Akerlof and Kranton
(2003, 2005, and 2008). I will refer to the relationship of this paper with a series of research papers by Akerlof and
Kranton later in this section.
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depend on the outcome of the ﬁrm.7 For example, a manager usually feels pressure if a project fails
but feels pleasure if it is successful. This pressure or pleasure may come from various sources, such
as the reputation for being a good or bad manager, the agent’s fulﬁllment of his responsibility as the
manager, a sense of achievement, or self-satisfaction. In this way, the manager’s payoﬀ depends not
only on the standard material payoﬀ but also upon the nonmaterial (psychological) payoﬀ, which is
contingent upon the outcome of the project.8 This point is very important when I evaluate whether
the optimal organizational form is H-form or T-form.
Related to the issue of the optimal organizational form, I have to consider another critical issue
in H-form organizations, which is what type of agent the principal should choose as the manager. In
this paper, I consider agents who are heterogeneous with respect to productivity. Then, I have to
examine whether a more or a less productive agent should be appointed manager. To examine the
optimal type of manager in H-form organizations is another important purpose of this paper.
Through studying this model, I obtain the following results. First, I show that the principal should
appoint a more (less) able agent to be the manager when the eﬀects of peer pressure are more (less)
critical. In addition, I ﬁnd the conditions under which H-form is more likely to be preferred to T-form.
Finally, I brieﬂy consider the phenomenon of the proliferation of job titles to give an interpretation of
the results of the current model and conﬁrm the conditions in which such proliferation occurs in the
context of this model.9
Many researchers have recently developed principal-agent models incorporating psychological ef-
fects. However, there has been little literature that places attention not only on the psychological view
but also on the sociological view and studies organizational forms.10 One of the exceptions is Akerlof
and Kranton (2003, 2005, and 2008: henceforth, AK). They are closely related to this paper in terms
of aim and motivation. They try to construct an economic model of identity and work incentives.
They consider a principal-agent model where an agent’s identity leads to behavior that is more or less
in concert with the goals of his organization. Moreover, the principal can change an agent’s identity
through using a supervisor who reports an agent’s activity. The agent adopts a work group identity
7Akerlof and Kranton (2003) explain this point by comparing the Weberian and post-Weberian views. While the
post-Weberian view is that employees identify with their work group rather than with the organization as a whole, the
Weberian view is that employees identify with the ﬁrm and experience a loss in utility if they do not act in the interests
of that ﬁrm.
8As seen here, this nonmaterial (psychological) payoﬀ may include more material considerations, such as gaining
or losing the chance for further promotion opportunities. However, I refer to the nonmaterial part of the manager’s
payoﬀ as the “psychological” payoﬀ of the manager in this paper, as such a payoﬀ is scarcely considered in the standard
economic model, and moreover does not arise until the manager’s identity changes.
9Strang and Baron (1990) examine the structure of job titles in the California state government and investigate why
some kinds of work roles are subdivided into many job titles and others into very few. For example, there is little
diﬀerentiation among doctors, but there are detailed job ladders in each branch of engineering.
10On the importance of the sociological view for organizational economics, Gibbons (2005) emphasizes that economic
sociology is helpful to think about how organizations are and should be structured and managed.
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when the principal does not use a supervisor, but he adopts an outsider identity when she appoints a
supervisor. The main diﬀerence between these two kinds of identity is that the ideal eﬀort level of a
work group identity is larger than that of an outsider identity. Note that the agent’s utility falls when
his eﬀort level deviates from his ideal level. They mainly show that introducing payoﬀ related to an
identity reduces the wage diﬀerence needed to induce higher eﬀort. However, when the agent has an
outsider identity, the principal also compensates his disutility from the gap between the agent’s ideal
low eﬀort level and the high eﬀort level preferred by the principal.
This paper as well as AK considers a principal-agent model and the principal can change an agent’s
identity through her policy. However, this model diﬀers from that of AK in several critical ways. First,
we consider multiple agents who form a reference group. The behaviors of the agents in this group are
aﬀected by peer pressure. Thus, we capture the interaction of the agents who have the same identity
toward their reference group. Second, although AK suppose that the principal appoints an outside
supervisor, I consider that the principal chooses the manager among the existing group of agents.
By this formulation, we can study the optimal form of organization endogenously. Third, I suppose
that the agents are heterogeneous in terms of productivity. This setting enables me to generate some
results on the optimal types of managers. Thus, these characteristics of this paper lead various fruitful
results beyond AK.
The remaining sections are organized as follows. I present the model in Section 2. In Section 3, I
ﬁnd the optimal type of manager in H-form. Then, I study the optimal organizational form in Section
4. Section 5 examines the phenomenon of the proliferation of job titles. Finally, I conclude the paper
in Section 6.
2 Model
In this model, there is a principal and multiple agents. All of them are assumed risk-neutral, but
the agents are protected by limited liability. The number of agents is n, where n ¸ 3. The agents
are engaged in a single project. Agent i provides his eﬀort ei 2 f0; 1g to the project at cost di(ei).
I assume that di(1) = di > 0 and di(0) = 0 for all i. I consider heterogeneous agents with respect
to the eﬀort cost. I assume that d1 < d2 < ¢ ¢ ¢ < dn. That is, agent i is a more able agent than
is agent i + 1. The outcome of the project, b 2 fbs; bfg, is bs if the project is successful, but bf if
the project fails. For simplicity, I assume that b = bs > bf = 0. Whether the project is successful is
contingent on agents’ eﬀorts, e = (e1; e2; : : : ; en). The wage to each agent depends on the outcome
and I suppose that wi(b) = wi ¸ 0 and wi(0) = 0. The project is successful with probability p(e),
whereas it fails with probability (1¡p(e)). I assume that p(e) = ph 2 (0; 1) if e = (1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; 1), otherwise
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p(e) = pl 2 (0; ph).
Here, I deﬁne two organizational forms, “T-form” and “H-form.” As mentioned in Section 1, the
diﬀerence between the two forms is determined by the job titles given to the agents by the principal.
On the one hand, T-form is the form where all agents are given the same job title. This means that
all agents are in the same reference group. Note that the members in a reference group feel pressure
(e.g., peer pressure) from themselves and from the group. Therefore, I suppose that each agent (a
member in T-form) feels peer pressure if his eﬀort level is below (or above) the average eﬀort level
of the other members in that group. As a result, the agent’s utility contains not only the material
payoﬀ but also the psychological payoﬀ from peer pressure. On the other hand, H-form is the form in
which one agent is appointed as the manager and the other agents work as the subordinates. Then,
the subordinates in H-form as well as the members in T-form identify with their reference group, but
the manager does not identify with that group, but rather with the ﬁrm to which he belongs. This
means that the subordinates feel peer pressure from each other as they are in the same reference
group, but the manager is out of that group and free from peer pressure. However, once the agent is
appointed manager, his utility contains a kind of psychological payoﬀ related to the outcome of the
ﬁrm, separate from that resulting from peer pressure. Thus, the psychological payoﬀs according to
job titles have an important role in this model.11
I now have to formulate the agent’s payoﬀ according to his job title. First, I represent the payoﬀ
for the agent i in the same reference group.12
ui = p(e)wi ¡ di(ei)¡ ®i(e); (2.1)
where ®i(e) represents the psychological payoﬀ for agent i. Concretely, ®i(e) is as follows.
®i(e) = ®maxfe¯¡i ¡ ei; 0g+ ®°maxfei ¡ e¯¡i; 0g; (2.2)
where e¯¡i is the average eﬀort level of the agents other than agent i in the reference group. That
is, suppose R is the set of agents in the reference group and that ]R is the number of agents in this
group. Then, e¯¡i =
P
j2R;j 6=i ej
]R¡1 .
13 I suppose that ® > 0 and 0 < ° · 1. This implies that agent i
has disutility when his eﬀort level is either below or above the average level of the other agents but
11Note that production technology is the same in both organizational forms. That is, I suppose that all agents are
equally engaged in a project regardless of their job titles. I believe that this view is not unusual. Baron and Kreps
(1999), for example, supports this view in the following way; “In two-tiered employment systems, for instance, there
are usually separate titles used to describe the higher- and lower-tier workers, who are performing tasks that are nearly
or even precisely identical.” (Baron and Kreps (1999), p.329)
12This case implies that the agent is either a member in T-form or a subordinate in H-form.
13As seen below, each agent decides his eﬀort level given others do eﬀort. In this respect, this formulation seems to
be interpreted that the agents’ reference eﬀort level is the high eﬀort level as a norm.
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that the disutility is larger when his eﬀort level is below than when his eﬀort level is above that of the
other agents.14 In addition, I suppose that the magnitude of the psychological payoﬀ, ®, is the same
for all agents.
Next, I consider the psychological payoﬀ for the manager i. As mentioned before, the manager
identiﬁes with the ﬁrm rather than with the reference group to which he belonged before he was
appointed the manager. Then, the manager will come to care greatly about the outcome of the
project, which is attributed to the beneﬁt of the ﬁrm, although he is free from the peer pressure
experienced among the members of the reference group. That is, the manager has negative feelings if
the project fails and has positive feelings if it is successful. Then, I suppose that agent i’s payoﬀ if
appointed manager is represented by:
ui = p(e)wi ¡ di(ei)¡ (1¡ p(e))¯ + p(e)¹¯; (2.3)
¯ (> 0) can be interpreted as how much the manager psychologically cares about the outcome. ¹
represents the degree of the positive psychological payoﬀ from success relative to the negative one from
failure. I assume that this psychological payoﬀ has the property of loss aversion, so that 0 < ¹ < 1.15
Finally, we consider the situation where the principal wants to implement e = (1; : : : ; 1) and then
her object is to minimize the total wage. The timing is as follows. First, the principal oﬀers a wage
contract to the agents, contingent on their job titles. Then, the agents decide simultaneously whether
to accept or reject the contract. If it is rejected by at least one agent, this game ends and each agent
receives the reservation utility, which is assumed to be zero. If it is accepted by all agents, the game
proceeds to the next stage. Then, each agent chooses his own eﬀort level. Finally, the output is
realized, and the principal pays wages to the agents according to the contract.
3 Optimal Type of Manager
In this section, I ﬁrst consider the agent’s participation constraint (henceforth, PC) and incentive
compatibility constraint (henceforth, IC) according to his job title, and ﬁnd the conditions under
which PC or IC is binding. Then, I calculate the total expected payment in the three cases of H-form,
which are divided by such conditions. Finally, by comparing these three cases, I show what type of
agent should be appointed manager.
First, I consider the constraints for member i in T-form. Suppose e¡i = 1, IC for the member i is
represented by:
14Note that ° does not have any eﬀect on the following analysis because, in this model, I suppose that eﬀort choice
is binary and that the outcome is so large that the principal prefers e = (1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; 1).
15See, for example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
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phwi ¡ di ¸ plwi ¡ ®) wi ¸ di∆p ¡
®
∆p
; (ICT)
where ∆p ´ ph ¡ pl. Assuming the reservation payoﬀ is zero, PC for the member i is represented by:
phwi ¡ di ¸ 0) wi ¸ di
ph
: (PCT)
From (ICT) and (PCT), the condition where (ICT) rather than (PCT) is binding is:
di ¸ ½®; (CT)
Note that both IC and PC for the subordinate i in H-form are the same as those for member i in
T-form as n agents are engaged in a project not only in T-form, but also in H-form.
Next, in H-form, IC and PC for the agent i who is appointed manager are as follows, respectively:
phwi ¡ di ¡ (1¡ ph)¯ + ph¹¯ ¸ plwi ¡ (1¡ pl)¯ + pl¹¯ ) wi ¸ di∆p ¡ (1 + ¹)¯: (ICM)
phwi ¡ di ¡ (1¡ ph)¯ + ph¹¯ ¸ 0) wi ¸ di
ph
+
¯
ph
¡ (1 + ¹)¯: (PCM)
(ICM) is given by supposing that e¡i = 1 and assuming that the reservation payoﬀ is zero. From
(ICM) and (PCM), the condition where (ICM) rather than (PCM) is binding is given by:
di ¸ (½¡ 1)¯: (CM)
So far, I have examined the conditions under which IC or PC is binding according to the job title
of the agent. Before ﬁnding the optimal type of manager in H-form, I categorize the agents by the
conditions obtained above. Such categorization diﬀers according to the following two cases: in Case
X, ® > (1¡ 1½ )¯, whereas in Case Y, ® < (1¡ 1½ )¯.16 This threshold can be obtained from (CT) and
(CM). Intuitively, Case X (Case Y) represents the situation where the eﬀect of peer pressure is more
(less) crucial relative to that of the manager’s concern about the outcome from the projects.
First, I consider Case X. I deﬁne some sets for the following analysis. N is the set of agents. M0
and M1 are the set of agents whose costs are di 2 (0; (½¡ 1)¯) and di 2 ((½¡ 1)¯; ½®), respectively.17
Moreover, M2 = Nn(M0 [M1). I interpret that M0 is the high-productivity group, M1 is the middle-
productivity group, and M2 is the low-productivity group. The number of agents in M0, M1, and
16See Figure 1 and 2. The analysis of the case where ® = (1¡ 1
½
)¯ is very simple. I will remark on this case later in
this section.
17For analytical tractability, I assume that di 6= (½¡ 1)¯, ½®, for all i.
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M2 is m0, m1, and m2, respectively. For analytical simplicity, I assume that m0 ¸ 1, m1 ¸ 1, and
m2 ¸ 1.18 In this setting, I have to consider three types of H-form: (1) H-form with the manager from
M0 (type HX0 ); (2) H-form with the manager from M1 (type H
X
1 ); and (3) H-form with the manager
from M2 (type HX2 ).
The total payment to HXz (z = 0; 1; 2) can be shown as follows:
WH
X
0 =
X
i2M0[M1
i 6=k0
di
ph
+
X
j2M2
n dj
∆p
¡ ®
∆p
o
+
dk0
ph
¡ (1 + ¹)¯ + ¯
ph
)WHX0 =
X
i2M0[M1
di
ph
+
X
j2M2
dj
∆p
¡ ®
∆p
m2 ¡ (1 + ¹)¯ + ¯
ph
; (3.1)
WH
X
1 =
X
i2M0[M1
i6=k1
di
ph
+
X
j2M2
n dj
∆p
¡ ®
∆p
o
+
dk1
∆p
¡ (1 + ¹)¯
)WHX1 =
X
i2M0[M1
di
ph
+
X
j2M2
dj
∆p
+
dk1
½∆p
¡ ®
∆p
m2 ¡ (1 + ¹)¯; (3.2)
and
WH
X
2 =
X
i2M0[M1
di
ph
+
X
j2M2
j 6=k2
n dj
∆p
¡ ®
∆p
o
+
dk2
∆p
¡ (1 + ¹)¯
)WHX2 =
X
i2M0[M1
di
ph
+
X
j2M2
dj
∆p
¡ ®
∆p
(m2 ¡ 1)¡ (1 + ¹)¯: (3.3)
Note that kz represents the agent who is appointed manager from Mz (z = 0; 1; 2). Now, I have the
proposition for the optimal type of manager in Case X.19
Proposition 1. In Case X, the optimal H-form is HX0 . That is, the principal should choose a more
able agent as the manager.
In Case X, the eﬀect of peer pressure (®) is relatively larger than that of the manager’s care for the
outcome (¯). When the principal appoints a less able agent to be the manager or the subordinate, she
18I can easily conﬁrm the results when the assumption that m0 ¸ 1, m1 ¸ 1 and m2 ¸ 1 is not satisﬁed. First,
consider the situations where only one set is empty and the other two sets are not empty. Then, although either set
is empty, the principal can save on payment by choosing an agent from more productive set as the manager. Next,
consider the situations where only one set is not empty and the others are empty. If only M1 is not empty, (3.2) says
that the principal should choose the most productive agent as the manager. However, if either M0 or M2 is not empty,
then it is irrelevant which agent the principal chooses from own set.
19Proofs of Proposition 1, 2, and 5 are presented in the Appendix.
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has to care about his incentives to exert high eﬀort. That is, I have to examine whether the principal
should impose on him (ICT) or (ICM). If the principal appoints him to be the subordinate instead of
the manager, then (ICT) binds and she can save on payment to him because peer pressure reduces
rent even when she makes him exert high eﬀort. On the other hand, when the principal appoints a
more able agent to be the manager or the subordinate, she has to care about if he accepts her oﬀer
or not. That is, I have to examine whether the principal should impose on him (PCT) or (PCM). In
Case X, the eﬀect of the manager’s care for the outcome is relatively small. Thus, this decision has
not critical eﬀect on the principal’s payment to the agent. As a result, since the eﬀect of reducing
rent by keeping a less able agent in the peer group is strong, the principal should appoint a more able
agent to be the manager.20
Next, I focus on Case Y. I also deﬁne some sets in this case. L0 and L1 are the sets of agents
whose costs are di 2 (0; ½®) and di 2 (½®; (½¡ 1)¯), respectively. L2 = Nn(L0 [ L1). The number of
agents in L0, L1, and L2 is l0, l1, and l2, respectively. I assume that l0 ¸ 1, l1 ¸ 1, and l2 ¸ 1.21 As
in Case X, I have to consider three types of H-form in this case: (1) H-form with the manager from
L0 (type HY0 ); (2) H-form with the manager from L1 (type H
Y
1 ); and (3) H-form with the manager
from L2 (type HY2 ). Then, I have the proposition for the optimal type of manager in Case Y.
Proposition 2. In Case Y, the optimal H-form is HY2 . That is, the principal should choose a less
able agent as the manager.
In Case Y, the eﬀect of peer pressure is relatively less critical than that of the manager’s concern
about the outcome. Just in Case X, the principal has to care about a less able agent’s IC whether he
is the manager or the subordinate. However, unlike in Case X, the principal can save on payment to
a less able agent by appointing him as the manager and imposing upon him (ICM) instead of (ICT)
because the peer pressure eﬀect is weak in Case Y. With a more able agent, this case can be considered
much like Case X. The principal has to care about a more able agent’s PC whether he is the manager
or the subordinate. By appointing him as the manager, the principal can change his PC from (PCT)
to (PCM) but it is not certain whether she can save on payment. Although a such change may or
20I should also consider the eﬀect of changing the job title for the agent in the middle-productivity group. Note that
such agent’s PC (IC) is binding when he is the subordinate (the manager). By changing his title from the subordinate
to the manager, the principal can impose (ICM) instead of (PCM) for him and this increases the material payment to
him. This result is the same as that in the standard moral hazard model. Of course, the principal’s payment to the
agent is inﬂuenced by her care for the outcome, but this eﬀect is trivial in Case X. Thus, the principal should choose
the manager from the set of the high-productivity group.
21Similar to Case X, I can also conﬁrm the results when the assumption that l0 ¸ 1, l1 ¸ 1 and l2 ¸ 1 is not
satisﬁed in this case. First, when only one set is empty, the principal can save on payment by choosing an agent from
a less productive set as the manager. Next, consider the situations where only one set is not empty and the others are
empty. If only L1 is not empty, (A.2) means that the principal should choose the less productive agent as the manager.
However, if either L0 or L2 is not empty, then it is irrelevant which agent the principal chooses from own set.
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may not be beneﬁcial for her, this eﬀect has less impact on the principal’s payment than the eﬀect of
appointing a less able agent as the manager. As a consequence, the principal should appoint a less
able agent to be the manager.22
To summarize the results regarding the optimal types of manager, the principal should appoint a
more able agent as the manager when the eﬀects of peer pressure are more critical. In this situation,
the principal should keep less able agents in the peer group because peer pressure gives them incentives
to increase their eﬀorts. On the contrary, when the eﬀects of peer pressure are trivial and the eﬀect of
the manager’s concern about the outcome instead is crucial, the principal should appoint a less able
agent as the manager. The principal cannot save on much rent by peer pressure even if she keeps a
less able agent in peer group. However, once she appoints him as the manager, she can save on more
rent by making the agent care for the outcome.
4 Optimal Organizational Form
In this section, I study the optimal organizational form by comparing T-form and H-form where the
principal appoints the appropriate agent as the manager. That is, we compare HX0 (H
Y
2 ) with T-form
in Case X (Case Y). For this purpose, I ﬁrst consider the total payment to T-form. This payment
diﬀers between Case X and Case Y. The total payment in each case is as follows, respectively:
WX =
X
i2M0[M1
di
ph
+
X
j2M2
dj
∆p
¡ ®
∆p
m2: (4.1)
WY =
X
i2L0
di
ph
+
X
j2L1[L2
dj
∆p
¡ ®
∆p
(l1 + l2): (4.2)
Then:
WH
X
0 ¡WX = ¡¯
h
1 + ¹¡ 1
ph
i
= ¡ (1 + ¹)¯
ph
h
ph ¡ 11 + ¹
i
; (4.3)
and
22As the same of Case X, I should consider the eﬀect of changing the job title for that agent in the middle-productivity
group. By changing the job title from the subordinate to the manager, the principal can impose (PCM) instead of
(ICM) for the agent. This enables for the principal to save on the material payment. However, the beneﬁt from the
change of the psychological payoﬀ is greater when a less able agent becomes the manager than when the agent in
the middle-productivity group does. In Case Y, this eﬀect in terms of psychological payoﬀ is greater than the former
eﬀect of the reduction of material payoﬀ. This leads the result that the principal should choose the manager from the
low-productivity group.
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WH
Y
2 ¡WY = ®
∆p
¡ (1 + ¹)¯: (4.4)
From (4.3) and (4.4), I can obtain the following proposition on the optimal organizational form.
Proposition 3. The optimal organizational form is as follows:
(i) In Case X, where (1¡ 1½ )¯ < ®, H-form is optimal if 11+¹ ´ pX < ph.
(ii) In Case Y, where ® < (1¡ 1½ )¯, H-form is optimal if ®¯ 11+¹ ´ pY < ∆p.
First, ¹ aﬀects the optimal organizational form both in Case X and in Case Y. H-form is preferable
to T-form in both cases as ¹ increases because pX and pY are decreasing in ¹. Thus, if the manager
is more likely to enjoy the psychological payoﬀ from the success of the project, then, in both cases,
H-form is more attractive to the principal. This result implies that the principal should choose H-form
if she can let the manager identify with her purpose and if he derives pleasure from the success of the
project as she does.
In contrast to ¹, ® and ¯ aﬀect the optimal organizational form only in Case Y although it is
independent of such parameters in Case X.23 In Case X, the principal appoints the agent whose PC
is binding regardless of his job title to be the manager. Then, the number of the agents whose PCs
are binding in H-form is the same as that in T-form, so the eﬀect of ® does not appear. That is,
the eﬀects of peer pressure work the same way in both forms. Thus, the diﬀerence in the payments
between the two forms is attributed only to the psychological payoﬀ of the manager, ¯[1 + ¹¡ 1=ph].
However, it is obvious that the sign of this term does not depend on ¯, given that ¯ > 0. Therefore,
the condition determining whether H-form or T-form is optimal in Case X is independent of ® and ¯.
On the contrary, ® and ¯ have a crucial role in determining the optimal form in Case Y. Choosing
H-form brings the principal both negative and positive eﬀects. On the negative side, she has to give
up the opportunity of giving the agent the incentive to choose high eﬀort via peer pressure. On the
positive side, she can save on rent because the agent cares for the outcome. Because the eﬀect of
peer pressure is less critical than that of the manager’s caring for the outcome in Case Y, the positive
eﬀect overcomes the negative one so that H-form is more attractive for the principal than T-form.
Thus, the principal should choose H-form and let the agent identify with the ﬁrm whenever the peer
pressure has little eﬀect on the incentive to work.
In addition, pl also aﬀects the determination of the optimal organizational form in Case Y. The
principal has to give up the beneﬁt from peer pressure when she chooses H-form and appoints a less
23Needless to say, ®, ¯, and ½ indirectly aﬀect the result in Case X through the condition via which either Case X or
Case Y is realized.
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able agent as the manager. Precisely, this loss of beneﬁt is ®=∆p. Then, given ph, as pl is decreasing,
this eﬀect is diminished and H-form is preferable to T-form. This implies that the principal should
allow a less able agent to identify with the ﬁrm when the probability of success would drastically drop
if even one agent shirks from exerting high eﬀort.
5 Proliferation of Job Titles
In this section, I brieﬂy discuss the proliferation of job titles as a possible application of the current
model. Sociologists have studied the structure of job titles in organizations although there is too
little economic research on it. In one example of this sociological literature, Strang and Baron (1990)
study this issue from the view of job title proliferation. They investigate variations in the proliferation
of job titles across diﬀerent kinds of work within the California state government. They show that
the proliferation of job titles depended on political, social, and institutional forces, as well as on
organizational size and environmental complexity. As cited in Strang and Baron (1990), DiPrete
(1989) cites evidence that job title distinctions were advocated by early architects of the federal
civil service to segregate the professions from lower status work. From this viewpoint, I can see the
phenomenon of job title distinction as a device that segregates some people from those who are engaged
in lower status work. Then, when an agent is chosen as the manager and is free from peer pressure,
this implies that a kind of job title proliferation occurs.24 Adopting this view in the context of this
paper, I interpret that job title proliferation occurs when the principal prefers H-form to T-form.
I have studied the model in which only one agent leaves the reference group by being given a new
job title. In Section 3, I presented the results (Proposition 1 and 2) that the principal chooses such
an agent from the set of the high-productivity (M0) group in Case X and from the set of the low-
productivity group (L2) in Case Y. That is, I found the optimal set from which the principal chooses
an agent to which she will give a new job title. Note that these results do not determine which agent
should be chosen from the optimal set in each case. However, it is not diﬃcult to determine whether
the principal should give new job titles to other agents who are also in the optimal set as long as I
suppose that the agents who are additionally appointed to be managers have the same utility function
represented by (2.3). This is because the principal’s problem does not change the problem I have
studied. Now, I have the following corollary.25
Corollary 1. In both Case X and Case Y, if H-form is better than T-form for the principal, then she
24Baron and Pfeﬀer (1994) point out that the proliferation of job titles can reduce the tendency to seek similar
treatment, citing Lansberg (1989).
25There is a possibility that the agents who are appointed as managers form a new reference group and they are agein
aﬀected by peer pressure. However, I do not consider such a scenario for reasons of analytical simplicity.
13
should appoint all agents in the optimal set to be the managers.
Here, I call this stage of proliferation the “ﬁrst-round proliferation.” Next, I try to examine the
possibility that a further proliferation (the “second-round proliferation”) will occur in the current
model. After the ﬁrst-round proliferation, the agents in the optimal set disappear. That is, I consider
the situations where only M1 and M2 exist in Case X and where only L0 and L1 exist in Case Y.
In these situations, I investigate whether the principal should appoint some additional agents to a
superior job title, such as “sub-manager.” For simplicity, I suppose that the utility of the sub-manager
has the same property as that of the manager (2.3).26 Under this setting, in Case X, I can easily show
that HX1 is better than H
X
2 in Case X after the optimal set (M0) disappears. Also, I can show that
HY1 is better than H
Y
0 in Case Y after L2 disappears. Then, I should examine whether the principal
prefers H-form to T-form. If the principal chooses H-form, I can interpret that the second-round
proliferation of job titles occurs. I have the following proposition on this issue.
Proposition 4. The second-round proliferation occurs in the following ways.
(i) In Case X, the principal should appoint a more able agent in M1 to be the manager. In addition,
all of the agents in M1 should be managers when ®¯ < (1 + ¹)∆p.
(ii) In Case Y, the principal should appoint a less able agent in L1 to be the manager. In addition,
all of the agents in L1 should be managers when ®¯ < [1 + ¹¡ 1ph ]
∆p
1¡∆p .
First, Proposition 4 means that, when the principal appoints an agent as the manager from M1 or L1,
she has to care about which agent should be chosen. Note that, once the agent is appointed to be the
manager, his binding constraint changes from PC to IC (from IC to PC) in Case X (Case Y). Then,
the productivity of the agent appointed as the manager aﬀects the principal’s payment so that she
has to care about which type of agent should be appointed as the manager. Second, this proposition
means that the condition for the second-round proliferation is stricter than the ﬁrst-round one.
Now I should summarize the results from this proposition as well as Proposition 3. First, the
proliferation seems to be more likely to occur when the eﬀect of peer pressure is not so signiﬁcant.
This means that when peer pressure works well as an incentive, the principal should exploit this eﬀect
by keeping the agents in their reference group so that she can save on payment to them. Second, the
more important cooperation is (e.g., the larger ∆p is), the more likely it is that proliferation will occur.
That is, when the probability of success of the project decreases drastically if just one agent does not
26The implications of the results obtained below do not change even if I suppose, for example, that the sub-manager’s
concern about the outcome is less than the manager’s. In what follows, I treat “sub-manager” as “manager” for
discretional simplicity.
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exert eﬀort, the principal is more likely to be better oﬀ by appointing some agents to be managers.
In this situation, the eﬀect of peer pressure is weakened, so the principal cannot eﬃciently provide
incentives to the agents by keeping them in their reference group. Finally, the larger the manager’s
concern about the outcome is and the more the manager experiences a gain when the project succeeds,
the more likely it is that proliferation will occur. This implies that, when the eﬀect of the manager’s
gain-loss feeling from the outcome overcomes the eﬀect of peer pressure, the principal should divide
the group of the agents by providing the diﬀerent job titles. As a result, it is important that the
principal lets the agents identify with her purpose. If the principal can do so, she would be better oﬀ
due to the proliferation of job titles.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I study the optimal organizational form and the optimal type of manager by considering
the psychological payoﬀ as well as the standard material payoﬀ for the agents. Speciﬁcally, I compare
two organizational forms, H-form and T-form. T-form is the form where all agents have the same job
title so that they are in a single reference group. On the other hand, H-form is the form where one
agent is appointed manager and other agents work as subordinates, who form a reference group.
I consider two cases. One is the case where the agent’s psychological payoﬀ is more signiﬁcant than
the manager’s psychological payoﬀ. In this case, I show that the principal should appoint a more able
agent as manager in H-form. Compared to T-form, H-form is preferable as the project is easier and
the manager receives a greater beneﬁt when the project is successful. By contrast, in the other case,
I can assert that the principal should appoint a less able agent as manager in H-form. Compared to
T-form, as in the previous case, H-form is preferable as the project is easier and the manager receives
a greater beneﬁt when the project is successful. In addition, H-form is preferable as the manager’s
psychological payoﬀ is higher and the agent’s psychological payoﬀ is less important. In addition, I
interpret the result that H-form is preferable to T-form as the proliferation of job titles occurs.
The issue of organizational forms, including the problem of the optimal type of manager, is very im-
portant for economics of organizations. This importance has been emphasized not only by economists,
but also by sociologists. Moreover, I have learned that the psychological aspect of the agent’s payoﬀ
has a crucial eﬀect on his behavior. This paper focuses on these points and reaches some conclusions.
I hope that this research contributes to future research on organizations using both sociological and
psychological approaches.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
First, I can show that HX1 is better than H
X
2 (W
HX1 < WH
X
2 ). From (3.2) and (3.3):
WH
X
1 ¡WHX2 = dk1
½∆p
¡ ®
∆p
=
1
½∆p
(dk1 ¡ ½®):
Note that dk1 < ½® since k1 2M1. Then, I can show that WH
X
1 < WH
X
2 .
Next, I can show that HX0 is better than H
X
1 (W
HX0 < WH
X
1 ). From (3.1) and (3.2):
WH
X
0 ¡WHX1 = ¯
ph
¡ dk1
½∆p
=
1
½∆p
f(½¡ 1)¯ ¡ dk1g:
Since k1 2 M1, (½ ¡ 1)¯ < dk1 . Then, I can conclude that WH
X
0 < WH
X
1 . As a result, WH
X
0 <
WH
X
1 < WH
X
2 . ¤
Proof of Proposition 2
The total payment to HYz (z = 0; 1; 2) can be shown as follows:
WH
Y
0 =
X
i2L0
i 6=k0
di
ph
+
X
j2L1[L2
n dj
∆p
¡ ®
∆p
o
+
dk0
ph
¡ (1 + ¹)¯ + ¯
ph
)WHY0 =
X
i2L0
di
ph
+
X
j2L1[L2
dj
∆p
¡ ®
p
(l1 + l2)¡ (1 + ¹)¯ + ¯
ph
; (A.1)
WH
Y
1 =
X
i2L0
di
ph
+
X
j2L1[L2
j 6=k1
n dj
∆p
¡ ®
∆p
o
+
dk1
ph
¡ (1 + ¹)¯ + ¯
ph
)WHY1 =
X
i2L0
di
ph
+
X
j2L1[L2
dj
∆p
¡ dk1
½∆p
¡ ®
∆p
(l1 + l2 ¡ 1)¡ (1 + ¹)¯ + ¯
ph
; (A.2)
and
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WH
Y
2 =
X
i2L0
di
ph
+
X
j2L1[L2
j 6=k1
n dj
∆p
¡ ®
∆p
o
+
dk2
∆p
¡ (1 + ¹)¯
)WHY2 =
X
i2L0
di
ph
+
X
j2L1[L2
dj
∆p
¡ ®
∆p
(l1 + l2 ¡ 1)¡ (1 + ¹)¯: (A.3)
First, I can show that HY1 is better than H
Y
0 (W
HY1 < WH
Y
0 ). From (A.1) and (A.2):
WH
Y
1 ¡WHY0 = ¡ dk1
½∆p
+
®
∆p
= ¡ 1
½∆p
(dk1 ¡ ½®):
I can conclude that WH
Y
1 < WH
Y
0 as ½® < dk1 (k1 2 L1).
Next, I can also show that HY2 is better than H
Y
1 (W
HY2 < WH
Y
1 ). From (A.2) and (A.3):
WH
Y
2 ¡WHY1 = dk1
½∆p
¡ ¯
ph
= ¡ 1
½∆p
fdk1 ¡ (½¡ 1)¯g:
Since dk1 < (½ ¡ 1)q¯ (k1 2 L1), I can conclude that WH
Y
2 < WH
Y
1 . As a result, WH
Y
2 < WH
Y
1 <
WH
Y
0 . ¤
Proof of Proposition 5
I compare H-form to T-form after removing all agents from M0 in Case X. From the proof of
Proposition 1, I can conﬁrm that the principal should chooses the agent from M1 rather than from
M2 to become the manager. Then,
WH
X
1 ¡WX = dk1
½∆p
¡ (1 + ¹)¯
=
1
½∆p
fdk1 ¡ ph(1 + ¹)(½¡ 1)¯g: (A.4)
This means that the agent whose cost is less than ph(1 + ¹)(½ ¡ 1)¯ should be appointed to be the
manager. From Proposition 3 and Corollary 1, ph(1 + ¹) > 1 when there are no agents in M0. This
leads (½¡ 1)¯ < ph(1 + ¹)(½¡ 1)¯. As a result, the principal should appoint the agent whose cost is
in the region of ((½¡1)¯; ph(1+¹)(½¡1)¯) as the manager. In addition, if ½® < ph(1+¹)(½¡1)¯ ,
®
¯
1
1+¹ < ∆p, then the principal should appoint all agents in M1 to be managers.
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Next, in Case Y, the proof of Proposition 2 leads that the principal should chooses the agent who
becomes the manager from L1 instead of L0. Then,
WH
Y
1 ¡WY = ¡dk1
½
+
®
∆p
¡ (1 + ¹)¯ + ¯
ph
=
1
½
£
½f ®
∆p
¡ (1 + ¹)¯ + ¯
ph
g ¡ dk1
¤
: (A.5)
This means that the principal should appoint the agent whose cost is larger than ½f ®∆p ¡(1+¹)¯+
¯
ph
g
to be the manager. Now, I should conﬁrm whether ½f ®∆p¡(1+¹)¯+
¯
ph
g is in the region of (½®; (½¡1)¯)
or not.
First, I can show that ½f ®∆p ¡ (1 + ¹)¯ +
¯
ph
g < (½¡ 1)¯ , ®¯ < [1 + ¹¡ 1¡∆pph ]∆p. Suppose this
condition does not hold;
®
¯
¸ [1 + ¹¡ 1¡∆p
ph
]∆p: (A.6)
Note that, from Proposition 3, ®¯ < (1 + ¹)∆p must hold in the current situation. However, under
this condition, (A.6) cannot hold. Thus, the principal should appoint the agents whose cost is in the
region (½f ®∆p ¡ (1 + ¹)¯ +
¯
ph
g; (½¡ 1)¯) to be the manager.
In addition, if ½f ®∆p ¡ (1 + ¹)¯ +
¯
ph
g < ½® , ®¯ < [1 + ¹¡ 1ph ]
∆p
1¡∆p , for all of the agents in L1,
their costs are larger than ½f ®∆p ¡ (1 + ¹)¯ +
¯
ph
g. The principal should then appoint all the agents
in L1to be managers. ¤
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member &
subordinate
manager
(½¡ 1)¯ ½®
di
(PC)
Figure 1: The Condition whether (IC) or (PC) is binding in Case X.
(IC)
member &
subordinate
manager
(½¡ 1)¯½®
di
(PC)
Figure 2: The Condition whether (IC) or (PC) is binding in Case Y.
(IC)
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